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Abstract
This paper examines how the introduction of bond lending in China’s bond
market has affected violations of the law of one price, measured by the yield spread
between similar treasury bonds. To identify the effect of bond lending, we exploit
the fact that in China identical bonds are traded on two segmented markets and
bond lending has been introduced in only one of the two markets. We find that the
introduction of bond lending has led to a decline in deviations from the law of one
price. Consistent with an interpretation based on limits to arbitrage, a significant
fraction of the deviations from the law of one price in our sample represent actual
profit opportunities and the introduction of bond lending has reduced arbitrage
profits.
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1 Introduction
The law of one price (LOP) is a cornerstone of financial economics. It maintains that assets
with the same cash flows should be traded at the same price. The LOP principle not only
provides the foundations of many theoretical models (such as Black and Scholes (1973)),
but also the justification of investment strategies used in markets.1 Violations of LOP
are often observed, but there are different interpretations in the literature: one approach
suggests that non-fundamental factors such as noise and sentiment (Lamont and Thaler
(2003a)) are the causes for LOP violations, while another approach views price discrepancies
as the result of structural differences in dimensions like liquidity or pledgeability (see for
instance Garleanu and Pedersen (2011), Cipriani et al. (2018), and also the literature on
the “on-the-run” premium that we discuss below). To better understand the nature of LOP
violations, it is useful to analyze how they are affected by changes in market regulations
and policies.
In this paper we provide evidence on the effect of bond lending on LOP violations in
bond markets. This is an important empirical question because of the existing opposite
theoretical possibilities offered by the literature. A disequilibrium interpretation of LOP
violations suggests that allowing arbitrageurs to borrow bonds for short-selling will reduce
mispricing and LOP deviations. On the other hand, the search-based theory of Vayanos
and Weill (2008) predicts that the introduction of short-sales can create equilibria where
assets with identical cash flows have different liquidity and thus are traded at different
prices.
Empirically, it is challenging to identify the causal effect of security lending or short-
selling on LOP violations. Although plausibly exogenous changes in regulations about short
sales are not rare, it is often difficult to construct an appropriate comparison. To address
this issue, we exploit two unique features of China’s bond market. First, identical bonds
are traded in two parallel but segmented markets, the interbank market and the exchange
market. Second, at the end of 2006 bond lending was introduced only in the interbank
market. Thus, we can estimate the effect of bond lending by comparing the dynamics
of LOP violations for the same set of bonds across the two markets before and after the
introduction of bond lending. Our empirical identification strategy is similar to that of
Chen et al. (2019), who estimate the value of asset pledgeability by exploiting a policy
shock that reduced the pledgeability of some bonds on the exchange market only.
1For example, one of the strategies of the Long Term Capital Management hedge fund was meant to
arbitrage the price difference between US Treasury bonds with similar cash flows.
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To measure LOP violations, we first construct pairs of treasury bonds with similar
residual cash flows and maturity dates.2 We use daily transaction data from 2000 to 2019
to measure LOP deviations as the yield spread between matched treasury bonds that are
traded within a reasonably short time window. We then analyze how the introduction
of bond lending in China’s national interbank market has affected LOP deviations. Our
approach allows us to control for market-fixed effects that capture differences in investor
bases between markets and other unobservable characteristics,3 as well as for observable
market-specific time-varying variables such as market volume. Moreover, our empirical
approach controls for observable and unobservable pair-specific time-varying factors, thus
ruling out biases arising from changes in the composition of our sample around the time
of the policy change. Our estimates show that the introduction of bond lending has led
to a decline of on average 29 to 34 basis points in LOP deviations, consistent with the
limits-to-arbitrage view (e.g. Lamont and Thaler (2003a)). Moreover, we find that this
effect is stronger for pairs of bonds with a larger difference in their issuance dates, as
suggested by the theory.
We then test other theory-based hypotheses concerning arbitrage profits and liquidity.
The limits-to-arbitrage view hypothesizes that arbitrage profits net of lending fees are
positive at least before the introduction of bond lending and they decline as a result of
arbitrage activity. The liquidity-premium view formalized in Vayanos and Weill (2008)
instead predicts that while notional gross arbitrage profits increase after the introduction
of bond lending, net arbitrage profits are negative. Consistent with the limits-to-arbitrage
view, we find that at least some of the LOP deviations in our sample represent true profit
opportunities and that the introduction of bond lending has reduced gross arbitrage profits
by more than 50 basis points as a percentage of the value of borrowed bonds. Finally,
we show that the introduction of bond lending did not lead to asymmetric changes in the
liquidity of matched bonds, contrary to the prediction of the asymmetric equilibrium of
Vayanos and Weill (2008)’s model.
This paper contributes to several strands of literature. First, we contribute to the lit-
erature on China’s bond markets. China’s bond market has experienced rapid growth and
a series of reforms in recent years and has attracted a growing amount of academic works.
2While corporate bonds are also listed on both the interbank market and the exchange market, the num-
ber of different corporate bonds with similar maturity dates issued by the same entity is limited. Combining
bonds issued by different entities is problematic because yields reflect also issuer-specific characteristics
such as credit risk.
3Liu et al. (2019) find that the same enterprise bond trades at a higher yield in the exchange market
because of higher demand from yield-chasing retail investors.
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Amstad and He (2020) provides a comprehensive overview of China’s bond markets. In
particular, some of the papers in the literature have analyzed differences in bond prices
between the exchange market and the interbank market. Chen et al. (2019) evaluates the
effects of a policy change that reduced the pledgeability of some bonds in the exchange
market, while leaving the pledgeability of the same set of bonds in the interbank mar-
ket unaffected. Fan and Zhang (2007) analyze the discrepancy in interest rates of bond
repurchase agreements between the exchange market and the interbank market. Liu et
al. (2019) show that enterprise bonds tend to have higher prices in the exchange market
than in the interbank market due to the demand effect of yield-chasing retail investors.
An important distinction between our paper and the previous literature is that while other
works have focused on differences in bond prices between the two markets, we analyze
LOP violations within each market.
Second, we contribute to the literature on short-selling restrictions as limits to arbitrage.
A large number of paper have shown that short-sale constraints explain mispricing in asset
markets, including stocks overpricing (Jones and Lamont (2002)), cross-sectional stock
returns anomalies (Nagel (2005), Chu et al. (2020)), put-call parity violations in the options
market (Ofek et al. (2004)) and LOP violations in equity carve-outs (Lamont and Thaler
(2003b)). The literature has not yet studied the effect of short-selling restrictions on LOP
violations in bond markets.
Finally, we contribute to the literature on the “on-the-run” premium. The empiri-
cal stylized fact that motivates this literature is that the most recently issued US Treasury
bonds sell at a premium relative to similar but more seasoned treasury bonds.4 This finding
arises from the excess liquidity embedded in the on-the-run bonds ( Amihud and Mendelson
(1991), Warga (1992), Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich et al. (2005), Christensen et al.
(2020)). In related work, Graveline and McBrady (2011) argue that the “on-the-run” pre-
mium reflects the asset’s specialness, that is the fact that on-the-run bonds can be loaned
at higher fees than off-the-run bonds. Although there are technical differences, for exam-
ple, in how we construct pairs of similar bonds, between our empirical approach and this
line of literature, our paper also deals with yield differentials between comparable treasury
bonds. Relative to the existing literature, we adopt a novel methodological approach by
studying how yield differentials respond to the introduction of bond lending.




In this section, we provide background information on China’s two co-existing bond markets,
the introduction of bond lending in the interbank market and the aggregate bond lending
activity.
2.1 China’s Parallel Bond Markets and Treasury Trading
Segmentation is a special feature of China’s bond market. Two markets co-exist for primary
bond issuance and secondary trading and are oversighted by different regulatory bodies:
the interbank market (i.e. China Foreign Exchange Trade system) and the exchange market
(i.e. Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange).5 The exchange market was
established first in 1990. However, due to concerns about banks’ speculation in the stock
market through debt financing and repo transactions, a separate market was established
exclusively for banks in 1997. Other participants were later allowed to operate in the
interbank market, including securities companies, insurance firms and mutual funds. Non-
bank financial institutions also participate in the exchange market together with individual
and corporate investors.6 The two markets differ not only in the investor base, but also
in market structure and trading protocols. The interbank market is an over-the-counter
(OTC) market, based essentially on bilateral bargaining, whereas trading on the exchange
is centralized and order-driven.
Treasury bonds are dual-listed and traded in both markets.7 Treasury bonds trading
in the interbank market accounts for almost 99% of the total trading volume in the two
markets between 2000 and 2019. During the same period, the average trade size of
treasury bond was 837 million RMB in the interbank market and 26.5 million RMB in the
exchange market. While trades tend to be larger in the interbank market, participants trade
treasuries more actively on the exchange market. For bonds that record any trading during
their listing period, the average number of trading days is 96 days on an annual basis in
the exchange market and 50 days in the interbank market. Similar trading patterns are
5See Amstad and He (2020) for an overview of China’s bond market development, and different types
of debt instruments traded in two markets. More recently in July 2020, China has approved to connect
the interbank and the exchange bond markets, which would in theory unify domestic bond markets and
eliminate price disparities across the trading venues (see Announcement No.7 [2020] of PBoC and CSRC
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/en/3688253/3689009/3788480/4061345/index.html).
6Commercial banks are not allowed to participate in repo transactions in the exchanges market and
have limited access to the exchange market, although some restrictions were removed in 2010.
7Other securities that are listed on both markets include financial bonds, enterprise bonds, local gov-
ernment bonds, municipal corporate bonds, government-backed agency bonds and asset backed securities.
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also found across all debt instruments in the two markets according to Chen et al. (2019).8
The reason for this pattern is that the interbank market is dominated by large institutional
investors such as large state banks and national joint-stock commercial banks that favor a
“buy-and-hold” investment strategy.
2.2 The Introduction of Bond Lending in the Interbank Market in
2006
Although securities lending has long been used in international bond markets, it was in-
troduced in China only in the end of 2006. In November 2006, securities lending was
introduced in the national interbank bond market by the People’s Bank of China (PBoC)
with the goal of facilitating market liquidity and enhancing market effectiveness.9 In the
publications of PBoC and China Central Depository and Clearing Co., LTD (CCDC), bond
lending is defined as a type of bond financing business in which the bond borrower provides
a certain amounts of collateral and borrows the object bond from the bond provider, under
the agreement that the loaned securities (the object bond) are returned and the collateral
passed back to the borrower on a future date. During the lending period, the bond bor-
rower should refund any incurred interest payment of the object bond to the bond provider
in time. The bond borrower pays the bond lending cost to the bond provider and the cost
standard is determined by both parties through negotiations.
The introduction of bond lending was meant to facilitate market liquidity, accelerate
bond turnover and provide investors with a new instrument for risk management and the
implementation of complex investment strategies.10 It established a mechanism for shorting
bonds, allowing investors to sell bonds they do not own.11 Importantly for our empirical
analysis, a similar mechanism for shorting bonds was absent in the exchange market and
is still missing (despite a bond lending trial on the Shanghai Stock Exchange in March
8According to Chen et al. (2019), while more than 90% of the monetary volume of spot transactions
for all bonds takes place on the interbank market, the exchange market accounts for 75% to 95% of all
spot transactions in terms of the number of trades. The average trade size for spot transactions is 100 to
200 million RMB on the interbank market, compared to 0.3 to 1 million on the exchange average over all
debt instruments.
9Announcement [2006] No.15 of the People’s Bank of China on Interim Provisions on the Administration
of Bond Lending and Borrowing Business in the National Interbank Bond Market on 2 November 2006.
http://www.gov.cn/govweb/zwgk/2006-11/06/content_433729.htm
10See PBoC’s announcement http://www.pbc.gov.cn/english/130721/2831941/index.html
11Although outright repos, introduced in 2004 in both bond markets, could also be used for short-
selling, repos are designed as a mechanism for lending and borrowing cash, rather than a security financing
mechanism. In section 6.4 we further discuss this point.
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(a) 2006-2012 (b) 2013-2019
Figure 1: The growth of bond lending settlement volume in the interbank market.
2015). As remarked in the “China’s Bond Market Overview” published by CCDC in 2016,
“at present, bilateral bond lending is only established in the interbank market.”
Since its inception, bond lending experienced steady growth in 2007 and 2008 in the
interbank market, with settlement volume reaching around 2 billion RMB and 5 billion
RMB respectively, see Figure 1a. Between 2009 and 2011, bond lending activities subsided,
partially because of the global financial crisis and partially due to limited participation by
larger bank institutions. As shown in Figure 1, bond lending transactions started to grow
at a rapid pace in 2012 and total transactions reached 4570 billion RMB by the end of
2019. The average growth rate during 2012 and 2019 is around 158%. In 2019, monthly
trading volume of securities lending accounts for 3% of the total trading in the cash
bond interbank market. This is comparable to the volume of important debt instruments
such as medium-term notes, short-term commercial papers and local government bonds.12
The main participants in bond lending transactions are large national commercial banks,
joint stock commercial banks, securities funds, insurance funds and money market funds.
As illustrated in Table 1 for December 2019 data, in recent years national banks have
dominated the market in terms of trading amount, but securities companies have been the
most active participants in terms of number of trades. National commercial banks and joint
stock commercial banks are often lenders in this market, while city and rural commercial
banks and securities companies are usually borrowers (see Table 2 in the Appendix for
12In December 2019, the trading volume of different debt instruments in cash bond market is distributed
as the following: interbank CD (24%), policy financial bond (35%), treasury bond (22%), medium-term
note (3.7%), short-term commercial paper (2.7%), local government bond (2.6%), securities lending
(2.5%), and others (5.5%). Source: http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/english/mdtmtov
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details on 2019 data).
Lending fees vary by the type of institutions involved in the transaction, the transaction
amount, the object bond and the contract length. Table 1 reports average lending fees by
institution type in December 2019 (for more details see Table 3 in the Appendix). In terms
of debt instrument, lending of treasuries takes almost half of the total transactions. For
example, between 2017 and 2019, 43% of all bond lending transactions are for treasury
bonds on average, with policy bank bonds take another 43% and the remaining goes to
lending of local government bonds.
Table 1: Participants structure in the bond lending transaction in December 2019
Institution type Trading amount Share # of Share Lending fee (%)
(RMB bn) transaction weighted avg
National commercial bank 360 31% 943 23% 0.5213
Joint stock commercial bank 165 14% 648 16% 0.6995
City commercial bank 132 11% 659 16% 0.7033
Rural commercial bank 69 6% 417 10% 0.7764
Securities company 188 16% 1176 29% 0.6992
Others 253 22% 257 6% 0.4264
Total 1167 4100 0.5903
Source: Bond lending Monthly Bulletin, December 2019, China Foreign Exchange Trade System
Notes: Transactions (classified as per institution types) are the sum of buy and sell direction transactions.
“Others” include credit union, insurance companies, money market fund, including wealth management prod-
ucts issued by banks, foreign institutions, non-financial institutions, etc. Lending fee is the weighted average
among institutions within the institution type by trading amount.
3 Data
We rely on treasury bond characteristics and daily transaction data in the exchange and
interbank markets from WIND and China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS).
The data covers bond level fixed characteristics including a bond identifier, a cross-market
identifier for dual-listed bonds, the issuance date, the issuance amount, the maturity date,
the coupon rate, the term and the coupon frequency. It also includes bond level daily
transaction data on the yield to maturity, the close price, the daily high and low prices, the
transaction amount, the turnover ratio, and bid and ask prices in the interbank market.
We extract all treasury bonds issued between January 1, 2000 and December 9, 2019 in
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the interbank market and the exchange market.13 We do not use data on lending activity
for individual bonds, since such data is not available for the entire study period and the
whole sample of bonds.
3.1 Sample Selection
Within each market, we construct treasury bond pairs by matching bonds that have similar
residual cash flows. To form a pair we require that the maturity dates of the two bonds
are no more than five days apart. We choose a 5-day window because this ensures that
the two bonds are similar while allowing a sufficient number of observations. Our results
are robust to different choices of this parameter. In each pair, the matched bonds have
almost identical maturity dates and differ in their issuance dates. For each pair, we refer to
the bond issued more recently as the “new” bond and to the bond with an earlier issuance
date as the “old” bond.
Since our goal is to measure LOP deviations at the pair level, we match transactions
data for the new bond and the old bond in each pair. To obtain a sufficient number of
observations, we match daily transaction data for the new bond and old bond in a pair
within a window of +/-3 days.14 Thus, given an observation for the new bond at date
t, if we can find an observation for the old bond occurring between t − 3 and t + 3,
we record both observations as occurring at time t. If there is no exact day match and
there are multiple observations on the old bond within the window, we average them using
trading-volumes as weights (discussed in more detail below).
Importantly, we only use observations on trades that occurred at a time when both
bonds in a pair have a single residual cash flow consisting of the face value payment and
possibly a final coupon payment. For example if we are matching a bond with semiannual
coupon payments and a zero-coupon bond, we only consider trades within six months of
the maturity date. This allows us to compare the yields to maturity of the two bonds
in a pair without further assumptions or adjustments, similar to Amihud and Mendelson
(1991).
Finally we can match dual-listed bond pairs across markets. Dual-listed bonds have
the same bond-level characteristics such as issuance dates, maturity dates, and coupon
13Our sample includes newly issued book-entry treasury bonds and does not include their subsequent
offerings. We drop bonds that are never traded in any of the two markets since issuance.
14This procedure is important to guarantee a sufficient number of observations, since Chinese treasury
markets are not as active as the US market. Our results are robust to different choices of the number of
days in the window.
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frequency across markets, but they have different transaction data in each market.
Our original data includes 209 unique bonds (not including subsequent offering) issued
in the interbank market and 99 bonds issued in the exchange market (Table 1 in the
Appendix present the summary statistics of the original sample prior to the matching-pair
analysis). Based on the above sample selection criteria, we are finally left with 78 pairs -
17 pairs from the exchange market and 61 pairs from the interbank market. All the bonds
forming the 17 pairs in the exchange market are dual-listed. Our final matched sample
includes trading period from June 2005 to December 2019. Table 2 shows the number of
observations for each year and in each market. Table 3 summarizes number of observations
for each new-old maturity combination. Table 4 in the Appendix provides information on
the number of exact daily matches.
Table 2: Number of observations by year and market
Interbank Exchange
# of pairs # of trades # of pairs # of trades
2005 8 95 3 399
2006 12 137 3 289
2007 3 4 0 0
2008 5 76 1 82
2009 4 27 1 30
2010 1 59 0 0
2011 6 143 1 1
2012 4 142 2 12
2013 1 4 0 0
2014 10 112 1 2
2015 14 386 6 178
2016 12 309 4 421
2017 5 102 3 68
2018 6 467 3 82
2019 8 157 1 6
3.2 Descriptive Statistics on Yield Spreads
Using our matched sample, we construct pair-wise yield differences. We define the yield to
maturity spread of a bond pair i ∈ {1, ..., N} in market m ∈ {E, I} (where E stands for
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Table 3: Number of observations (pairs) for each combination of maturities
Maturity at issuance (years) old bond
new bond 1 2 3 5 7 8 10 15 Total obs.
0.25 24 25 4 14 67
(1) (1) (1) (2) (5)
1 461 853 698 266 278 2556
(4) (9) (8) (9) (5) (35)
2 134 20 16 436 606
(2) (3) (2) (6) (13)
3 376 18 66 460
(9) (3) (4) (16)
5 71 1 17 89
(4) (1) (1) (6)
7 1 11 12
(1) (2) (3)
Total obs. 24 486 987 1094 375 1 806 17 3790
(1) (5) (11) (20) (19) (1) (20) (1) (78)
exchange market and I stands for interbank market) on date t as:
yimt ≡ yold,imt − ynew,imt (1)
where ynew,imt and yold,mt are the respective yields to maturity. For each observation on
ynew,imt, if there is no matching old bond transaction data at date t, we impute yold,imt by
computing the trading volume-weighted yield to maturity of the old bond between t−3 and
t+ 3 (if there is no old bond trading data in this window, we drop the date-t observation
altogether).
As the focus of our study is on the level of mispricing for a pair of similar bonds, rather
than on whether the new bond is under- or over-priced relative to the old bond, we take
the absolute value of the yield spread defined in equation (15) to obtain a measure of
deviations from the LOP:
Yimt ≡ |yimt| = |yold,imt − ynew,imt| (2)
We now provide some descriptive statistics about pairwise yield differentials in our
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Figure 2: Distribution of the old bond-new bond yield spread yimt
Figure 2 shows the distribution of yield spread between old and new bonds of matched pairs. In specific,
the figure plots the distribution of yimt = yold,imt − ynew,imt, where m refers to exchange or interbank
market.
sample. Figure 2 presents the distribution of the yield difference between the new bond
and the old bond yimt (Figure 2 in the appendix plots yield to maturity for new and old
bonds separately). In both markets, we observe both positive and negative yield spreads.
The fact that the old bond often has a lower yield to maturity than the new bond seems at
odds with the “on-the-run premium” documented in the literature, such as Warga (1992),
Krishnamurthy (2002), Goldreich et al. (2005), and Christensen et al. (2020) who find
that the most recently issued US Treasury bonds sell at a premium relative to similar but
more seasoned bonds. The pattern we document however is consistent with the negative
on-the-run premium found in the Chinese bond market by Chen et al. (2015).15 At any
rate, one should be cautious in comparing our analysis with findings about the on-the-run
premium. The on-the-run bond is usually defined as the most recently issued bond with a
given maturity, while off-the-run bonds are previously issued bonds with the same maturity.
However, in our paper, the new bond and old bond in a given pair do not have the same
maturity at issuance and the new bond is not necessarily the most recently issued treasury
with a given maturity.
15Potential explanations include effects from liquidity premium in Chinese Treasury markets and the
irrational disposition effect, i.e. the fact that investors are more reluctant to sell the old off-the-run bonds
when they incur a loss from the investment, which leads to a higher price and a lower yield for old bonds
Chen et al. (2015).
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Another prominent feature of Figure 2 is that the fraction of observations close to zero
is larger in the interbank market than in the exchange market, suggesting lower deviations
from LOP in the former. To better analyze LOP deviations and their dynamics, we look
at the absolute yield spread Yimt. Figure 3 plots the average absolute yield spread for each
year between 2005 and 2019, pooling observations between the two markets. Figure 3
shows that the absolute yield difference has declined over time, suggesting China’s bond
markets have become more efficient between 2005 and 2019.
Figure 3: Absolute yield spread over time
Figure 3 shows the average level of the absolute yield spread across market from 2005 to 2019. The
absolute yield spread is defined as is defined as Yimt = |yold,imt − ynew,imt|, where m refers to exchange
or interbank market. Each bar represent the yearly average of daily observations Yimt across market.
Further probing into each market separately, evidence suggests the efficiency in the
interbank market improved more pronouncedly over time than in the exchange market.
Figure 4 plots the monthly average absolute yield spread over time for the exchange mar-
ket and the interbank market respectively. While spikes in the absolute yield spread persist
throughout the sample period in the exchange market, the absolute yield spread is consis-
tently closer to zero in the interbank market during the later years of our study.
4 Hypotheses
Our paper aims at testing how the introduction of bond lending in China’s interbank market
has affected LOP deviations, as measured by the absolute yield spread between bonds with
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Figure 4: Absolute yield spread over time, by market
Figure 4 is a scatterplot of the average absolute yield spread across market from January 2005 to December
2019. The absolute yield spread is defined as Yimt = |yold,imt − ynew,imt|, where m refers to exchange or
interbank market. Each dot represent the monthly average of the daily observations Yimt in each market.
similar residual cash flows. Interestingly, theoretical arguments provide opposite predictions
on how bond lending should affect LOP deviations. In this section we distinguish between
two theoretical frameworks, that we call the limits-to-arbitrage view and the liquidity-
premium view, and formulate testable hypotheses.
The theory of limits to arbitrage suggests that bond lending will reduce deviations
from LOP. This assumes that LOP deviations are due to non-fundamental factors such
as noise and sentiment (Lamont and Thaler (2003a)). LOP deviations then are true
profit opportunities and bond lending can be used by arbitrageurs to realize these profit
opportunities. Arbitrageurs can buy the cheaper bond and short sell the more expensive
one. In turn, by increasing the demand for the cheaper bond and the supply of the more
expensive one, arbitrage trades will induce the market to correct the initial mispricing
(assuming market prices respond to supply and demand pressures).
Contrary to the above prediction, there are also theoretical arguments suggesting that
the introduction of bond lending in over-the-counter markets will increase LOP deviations.
Vayanos and Weill (2008) show that the introduction of short-sales in a search market
model can create an equilibrium where assets with identical cash flows are traded at dif-
ferent prices.16 In such equilibrium, market participants prefer trading one of the assets
16The paper of Vayanos and Weill (2008) aims at explaining the on-the-run premium but the same
formal model can be applied in our case, since the mechanism does not rely on treasury auction cycles or
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because it is more liquid and this in turn increases that asset’s liquidity. The more liquid
asset trades at a premium over the less liquid one because its price reflects the savings in
search costs. Critically, Vayanos and Weill (2008) show that these asymmetric equilibria
can arise only if short-sellers are present because they are constrained to buy back the
asset they have previously borrowed. In the absence of this constraint, the asymmetric
equilibrium unravels as buyers prefer the cheaper asset. Inspired by these theoretical con-
siderations, we formulate the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a Limits-to-arbitrage view: the introduction of bond lending will decrease
LOP deviations.
Hypothesis 1b Liquidity-premium view: the introduction of bond lending will increase
LOP deviations.
Note that both Hypothesis 1a and Hypothesis 1b are derived from theoretical frameworks
that involve short-selling rather than security lending. In our empirical analysis, we do not
observe short-selling directly. However, under the plausible assumption that bond lending
is used at least in part to facilitate the short-selling of bonds, the underlying mechanisms
also leads to a prediction on the effect of bond lending. This holds even if there are other
mechanisms that can be used for shorting bonds, such are repos, as long as they are not
perfect substitutes of bond lending (see Section 6.4 for further discussion of this issue).
Theory also suggests how the effect of bond lending on LOP deviations will interact
with bond-specific characteristics, such as the time since issuance. When two bonds with
the same cash flows have a larger gap in their issuance dates, it is more likely that unso-
phisticated investors will perceive them as structurally different and will be willing to pay
different prices for them. This in turn creates bigger arbitrage opportunities and should
result in a larger decline in LOP violations once bond lending is allowed. Moreover, a larger
maturity gap may also act as an effective equilibrium selection mechanism in a model like
Vayanos and Weill (2008) where multiple equilibria are possible. Vayanos and Weill (2008)
show that for small search frictions the only remaining equilibrium is that short-sellers
concentrate in the asset with the larger effective supply (see their Proposition 11). Since
a bond’s effective supply decreases over time as the bond becomes locked away in the
portfolios of buy-and-hold investors, LOP violations are more likely to arise within pairs
where one bond was issued much earlier than the other.
other details of the definition of on- and off-the-run bonds.
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Hypothesis 2 The effect of bond lending on LOP deviations is stronger for pairs of bonds
with a larger difference in their issuance dates.
Note that this hypothesis holds under both the limits-to-arbitrage view and the liquidity-
premium view and therefore it does not allow us to distinguish between them.
The limits-to-arbitrage view and the liquidity-premium view make different predictions
about arbitrage profits. The limits-to-arbitrage view is based on the assumption that there
are opportunities for arbitrageurs to earn positive profits net of the costs of arbitrage, which
mainly consist of the lending fee the borrower of the asset need to pay to the lender. Thus,
notional net profits should be positive at least before the introduction of bond lending.
Since bond lending is assumed to allow arbitrageurs to correct market mispricing, there
will be fewer additional opportunities to exploit LOP violations after bond lending is in-
troduced. Therefore, net and gross profits should decline with bond lending. According
to the liquidity-premium view, instead, the introduction of bond lending will increase no-
tional gross profits from arbitrage. The reason is that bond lending allows a systematic
yield spread between identical bonds to emerge. However, as shown by Vayanos and Weill
(2008) (see their Proposition 10), arbitrage profits net of lending fees will be negative. Net
profits are negative because the asset with the higher price is also very costly to borrow,
due to its specialness.
Hypothesis 3a Limits-to-arbitrage view: gross arbitrage profits decline after the introduc-
tion of bond lending and arbitrage profits net of lending fees are positive at least before
the introduction of bond lending.
Hypothesis 3b Liquidity-premium view: gross arbitrage profits increase after the intro-
duction of bond lending, but net arbitrage profits are negative.
Finally, the liquidity-premium view makes a distinctive prediction about liquidity. If the
introduction of bond lending leads to the asymmetric equilibrium analyzed in Vayanos and
Weill (2008), then it should result in systematic differences in liquidity between bonds with
similar cash flows.
Hypothesis 4 Under the liquidity-premium view, the introduction of bond lending will
increase the difference in liquidity between matched bonds.
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5 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section we present the approach and the results of the empirical analysis. Sections
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3 provide tests of our main hypotheses, that is whether the introduction
of bond lending increased or decreased LOP deviations. Section 5.4 analyzes how the
introduction of bond lending has affected arbitrage profits. Section 5.5 tests for effects on
liquidity.
5.1 Non-Parametric Test
We begin the empirical analysis by testing Hypothesis 1 in a non-parametric approach. To
do this, we restrict attention to dual-listed bonds that are traded on both the interbank
market and the exchange market on the same set of dates. Define ∆it as the cross-market
difference in the absolute yield spread of bond pair i at time t:
∆it = YiIt − YiEt (3)
Here the index i is the cross-market identifier of a pair of bonds that is listed on both
markets. We refer to ∆it as the interbank market excess mispricing. We compare the
distribution of ∆it before and after the introduction of bond lending in the interbank
market, which occurred in November 2006. Thus we divide our sample in two subsamples:
the pre-policy subsample, made of observations before 2007, and the post-policy subsample,
made of observations starting in 2007. Comparing the two subsamples provides an estimate
of the causal effect of bond lending on LOP deviations. Clearly, our test assumes that if
bond lending had not been introduced in the interbank market, the distribution of∆it would
have remained constant over time for bond pair i. Using cross-market matches allows us
to remove confounding compositional effects due to pair-specific factors that may affect
mispricing. These factors are allowed to be time-varying, but we have to assume they are
common between markets for a given bond pair i.
Figure 5 plots the CDFs of ∆it in the pre- and post-policy samples. It is possible
to observe that the median value of ∆it is smaller in the post-policy sample than in
the pre-policy sample. Indeed, the pre-policy distribution of ∆it first-order stochastically
dominates the post-policy distribution of ∆it. Thus, evidence suggests the introduction
of bond lending has reduced LOP deviations, consistent with the limits-to-arbitrage view
(Hypothesis 1a). To test whether the difference in the distribution of ∆it before and
after the introduction of bond lending is statistically significant we use a one-sided non-
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parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test. The test rejects the null-hypothesis of no difference
with a p-value of 2.508× 10−11.
Figure 5: Distribution of the interbank market excess mispricing
Figure 5 plots the CDF of the excess mispricing in the interbank market (∆it) before and after 2007 - the
introduction of bond lending in the interbank market. The excess mispricing is defined as∆it ≡ YiIt−YiEt .
5.2 Main Regression Analysis
We now test the main hypothesis using a difference-in-differences regression design. The
dependent variable is the absolute yield difference Y
imt
of bond pair i ∈ {1, ..., N} in market
m ∈ {E, I} on a trading day t. The pair index i represents a cross-market identifier, so
that all observations on that pair are indexed by i no matter whether they are collected
from the exchange market or the interbank market. Note however that our sample for the
regression analysis contains also pairs of bonds that are traded on only one market and
pairs that are traded on both markets but on different dates.
The treatment group is made of observations from the interbank market m = I. The
treatment time is denoted by t∗. Bond lending was officially introduced in the interbank
market in November 2006. For clarity, and since in our sample there are not trading
observations in November of December 2006, we choose t∗ to be January 1, 2007. We
define the following dummy variable for observations in the interbank market after the
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1 if m = I and t ≥ t∗;
0 otherwise
(4)









+ ttmit + τt + εimt (5)
where α
i
is a pair-fixed effect, which captures pair-specific factors that may drive mispricing.
f
m
is a market fixed effects, equal to 1 if m = I and 0 otherwise, that controls for market-
specific factors that affect mispricing. To control for the effect of the business cycle and




is the same for
all observations in the same year). We control for the time-to-maturity of bonds in pair i
at time t, ttmit.
To test Hypothesis 1 we focus on the estimated coefficient δ, which measures the
causal effect of bond lending on LOP deviations. The main identification assumption of
our estimation is that if bond lending had not been introduced in the interbank market, the
dynamics of LOP deviations would have been identical between the interbank market and
exchange market. We will provide evidence and arguments in support for this assumption
in Section 6. At this point, we can partially address concerns by controlling for time-varying
factors that may differentially affect mispricing across the two markets. In particular bond
yields are likely to be affected by market-wide trading activity and liquidity. If the interbank
market volume evolves in systematically different ways from volume in the exchange market
and market-wide volume also affects mispricing, this could introduce a confounding factor.
To address this issue, we adopt a different version of the baseline regression where we
control for the monthly percentage change of treasury trading in each market gmt (note









+ ttmit + τt + gmt + εimt (6)
Another assumption underlying our baseline model is that the dynamics of mispricing
are the same across pairs with identical time to maturity. If this assumption is violated,
changes in the composition of the sample around the treatment time t∗ could lead to biased
estimates of δ. To control for this issue, we further consider an alternative and more general
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+ ttmit + τt + gmt + εimt (8)
Table 4: The Effect of Bond Lending on LOP Deviations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute yield spread Yimt Yimt Yimt Yimt
fm 0.330*** 0.335** 0.289** 0.294*
(0.117) (0.127) (0.136) (0.147)
Dmt -0.776*** -0.792*** -0.731*** -0.748***
(0.179) (0.189) (0.191) (0.201)
ttmit -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gmt 0.159* 0.184**
(0.087) (0.089)
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,790 3,790
R-squared 0.442 0.444 0.480 0.482
Pair FE Y Y
Time-varying pair FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Column (1)-(2) are estimated from specification (5) and column (3)-
(4) are estimated from specification (7). fm takes the value one for interbank
market. Dmt captures the treatment effect and takes the value one for observa-
tions starting from 2007 in the interbank market. All regressions control for the
bond pair’s time to maturity on date t (ttmit). Column (2) and (4) control for
the monthly growth of treasury trading amount in each market (gmt). Robust
standard errors clustered at the bond-pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table 4 reports the regression results. Across all specifications we find a significant
negative δ estimate. Thus, our regression analysis confirms that the introduction of bond
lending has decreased LOP deviations, consistent with the limits-to-arbitrage view (Hy-
pothesis 1a). On average, our findings point to a reduction in LOP deviations in the range
of 29 to 34 basis points. The regression results also show that the absolute yield spread is
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on average higher in the interbank market and is positively correlated with the market-wide
percentage change in the volume of treasury trading. Finally, the absolute yield spread
is declining in the time to maturity, a result consistent with the finding of Amihud and
Mendelson (1991) on the spread between US treasury notes and bills.
5.3 Heterogeneity
In this section we test Hypothesis 2, that is whether the effect of bond lending on LOP
deviations (established in the previous section) is be stronger for pairs of bonds with a
larger gap in their issuance dates. We define the “maturity gap” of pair i, gapi, as the
time (in days) between the issue dates of the two bonds in the pair. Note that gapi is
positive by construction and it varies only across bond pairs but not over time. We then
modify the baseline regression by interacting relevant variables with gapi. Our specification
therefore is:
Yimt = αi + fm + δDmt + ttmit + gapi + fm × gapi + γDmt × gapi + τt + gmt + εimt (9)
The coefficient γ on the interaction Dmt × gapi measures how the effect of bond lending
interacts with the maturity gap. As before, we estimate four versions of this regression,
which sequentially control for market-wide treasury volume and allow for time-varying pair-
fixed effects.
Results are presented in Table 5. Across all specifications the coefficient on Dmt ×
gapi is negative, although we estimate the coefficient with lower precision than in the
previous section. A negative interaction coefficient implies that bond lending causes a
larger reduction in LOP deviations for pairs with a larger maturity gap.
5.4 Effects on Arbitrage Opportunities
In previous sections we have shown that the introduction of bond lending has reduced the
yield differential between treasury bonds with similar residual cash flows. This suggests
that bond lending allows arbitrageurs to engage in trades that correct market mispricing.
In this section, we study the implications for arbitrage profits, similar to Krishnamurthy
(2002) and Amihud and Mendelson (1991).
To describe arbitrage profits, consider two bonds, indexed by 1 and 2, with the same
maturity date and no remaining dividends and assume r1 > r2, where r is the daily yield to
maturity. The arbitrage trade involves buying bond 1, borrowing bond 2 and selling bond
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Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects of Bond Lending on LOP Deviations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Absolute yield spread Yimt Yimt Yimt Yimt
fm 0.005 -0.017 -0.064 -0.088
(0.018) (0.018) (0.113) (0.105)
Dmt -0.068 -0.052 -0.040 -0.022
(0.220) (0.224) (0.243) (0.242)
ttmit -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
fm × gapi 0.161*** 0.174*** 0.175* 0.190*
(0.0293) (0.0240) (0.101) (0.104)
Dmt × gapi -0.509** -0.528** -0.482* -0.502*
(0.215) (0.217) (0.251) (0.255)
gmt 0.173* 0.196*
(0.088) (0.099)
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,790 3,790
R-squared 0.447 0.449 0.484 0.486
Pair FE Y Y
Time-varying pair FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Column (1)-(2) are estimated from specification (9) with pair fixed
effect and column (3)-(4) are estimated with time-varying pair fixed effect. gapi
is defined as the difference in the days since issuance between the older bond and
the newer one in the bond pair. fm takes the value one for interbank market.
Dmt captures the treatment effect and takes the value one for observations
starting from 2007 in the interbank market. All regressions control for the
bond pair’s time to maturity on date t (ttmit). Column (2) and (4) control for
the monthly growth of treasury trading in each market (gmt). Robust standard
errors clustered at the bond-pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1.
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2. The investor holds this position until maturity, for a total of n days. We assume the
investor uses the face value payment from bond 1 to cover the payment due to the lender
of bond 2 at maturity. This implies that Q1 ×FV1 = Q2 ×FV2, where Qj is the quantity
of bond j and FVj is its face value. Denote the annualized lending fee by F (which may
also depend on n). Then arbitrage profits are given by:




Dividing both sides of the equation by P2Q2, we can express the profit as a fraction of






























To measure arbitrage opportunities we use the annualized gross profits on the value of


















We focus on gross profits (π) instead of net profits (Π) for two reasons. First, to our
knowledge data on lending fees is available only for recent years and its quality is limited
(for instance it is not possible to observe the lending fee for specific treasury bonds, but
only for a given maturity). Second, we wish to compute notional arbitrage profits also for
periods before bond lending was allowed in the interbank market and for bonds trading in
the exchange market. No data on lending fees is available for these observations. Thus, we
first compute gross profits π for each observation and then we perform several analyses,
including comparing gross profits to an average lending fee based on available data.
To make our estimates of arbitrage profits as realistic as possible, whenever bid and
ask quotes are available we use them. Thus, whenever possible we set r1 equal to the ask
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yield of bond 1 and r2 equal to the bid yield of bond 2.
17 Finally, in the rest of this section
we set π = 0 when the notional arbitrage profits would be negative, i.e. when the ask yield
of bond 1 is lower than the bid yield of bond 2. In this case no arbitrage is possible and
we assume the trade would not be initiated.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of gross profits in our sample. While many of the
data points in our sample involves profits close to zero, there is a significant number of
profitable trade opportunities. Moreover, a considerable share of observations represent
arbitrage opportunities not only in terms of gross profits but also net profits. For example,
if we assume lending fees are around 0.6% per annum (average lending fees are between
0.4% and 0.8% in 2019, see Table 1), then 25% of observations are consistent with positive
net profits. Average gross profits are especially large before 2007 in both markets (equal to
1.02% and 1.48% for the interbank market and exchange market, respectively), but have
declined more sharply in the interbank market than in the exchange market from 2007 (to
0.27% and 1.31%, respectively).
Figure 6: The distribution of gross arbitrage profits
Figure 6 plots the cumulative distribution of annualized gross arbitrage profits as a percentage of the value
of borrowed bonds. The histogram is based on data from both markets, from January 2005 to December
2019. Profits are computed as in equation (14), using bid and ask yields when available. Profits are zero
when no arbitrage is possible. The red vertical line represents a benchmark lending fee of 0.6%.
After establishing that at least some of the LOP deviations documented in previous
sections represent true profit opportunities, we want to quantify the effect of bond lending
17Note that bid and ask quotes are not available for trades in the exchange market.
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in terms of arbitrage profits. To this end, we repeat our difference-in-differences analysis
using gross profits as dependent variable. The results are reproduced in Table 6. Our
regression analysis shows that the introduction of bond lending has reduced gross arbitrage
profits by more than 0.5%. This suggests that as bond lending has allowed arbitrageurs
to correct market mispricing more effectively, there are fewer additional opportunities to
exploit LOP violations. Overall, our findings on arbitrage profits are consistent with the
qualitative predictions of the limits-to-arbitrage view, described in Hypothesis 3a.
Table 6: Effects on Arbitrage Profits
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Arbitrage profit π
fm 0.264 0.269 0.228 0.234
(0.314) (0.300) (0.221) (0.211)
Dmt -0.576* -0.594* -0.546** -0.565**
(0.352) (0.340) (0.271) (0.265)
ttmit -0.001** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
gmt 0.184*** 0.197**
(0.066) (0.084)
Observations 3,790 3,790 3,790 3,790
R-squared 0.390 0.392 0.420 0.423
Pair FE Y Y
Time-varying pair FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: Column (1)-(2) are estimated from specification (5) and column
(3)-(4) are estimated from specification (7). fm takes the value one for in-
terbank market. Dmt captures the treatment effect and takes the value one
for observations starting from 2007 in the interbank market. All regressions
control for the bond pair’s time to maturity on date t (ttmit). Column (2)
and (4) control for the monthly growth of treasury transaction amount in
each market (gmt). Robust standard errors clustered at the bond-pair level
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
5.5 Effects on Liquidity
In this section we test whether the introduction of bond lending has led to asymmetric
changes in the liquidity of matched bonds, as predicted by the liquidity-premium view
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where Lold,imt and Lnew,imt are measures of the liquidity of the old bond and new bond
respectively. We use four different liquidity measures that are typically employed in the
literature: the daily trading amount, the daily turnover ratio (defined as daily transaction
volume over outstanding volume), the Amihud ratio (calculated as the bond’s daily return
over its trading volume) and the daily high-low price spread (calculated with the daily high
and low clean prices). The first two are quantity-based measures of liquidity, while the
last two are price-based measures of liquidity. For each of the four liquidity measures, we
repeat our difference-in-differences estimation using the liquidity difference as dependent
variable. In each of the four liquidity difference regressions, we adopt pair fixed effects
while controlling for the market-specific change in treasury trading as follows:
Limt = αi + fm + δDmt + ttmit + gmt + τt + εimt (16)
Table 7 shows the results. Across all four specifications, the introduction of bond
lending has a statistically insignificant effect on the difference in the liquidity of matched
bonds. This holds for both quantity-based and price-based measures of liquidity. This
finding contradicts the liquidity-premium view’s prediction that allowing short-selling will
lead to asymmetric changes in the liquidity (Hypothesis 4). The absence of liquidity effects
is consistent with our results on LOP deviations and arbitrage profits.
6 Robustness
In this section we discuss potential limitations of our empirical analysis and provide a
number of robustness tests of our findings concerning the effect of bond lending on LOP
deviations.
6.1 Placebo Test
We examine the dynamics of the relation between the introduction of bond lending and
LOP deviations. We do this by including a series of dummy variables in the baseline
regression to trace out the year-by-year effects on the absolute yield spread:
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Table 7: Effects on Liquidity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Limt Trading Turnover Amihud High-low
amount ratio ratio price spread
fm -2.059*** -1.570*** -1.831*** 0.207**
(0.647) (0.574) (0.653) (0.077)
Dmt 0.0686 -0.282 0.0436 -0.192
(0.685) (0.622) (0.771) (0.211)
ttmit -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
gmt 0.225 0.299* 0.054 0.106
(0.143) (0.171) (0.273) (0.142)
Observations 3,411 3,415 1,833 1,228
R-squared 0.426 0.355 0.333 0.184
Pair FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: All columns are estimated with pair fixed effect and year fixed
effect. Column (1)-(4) report separate regression results using the ab-
solute value of log difference between the older and the new bond in
a bond pair at date t in trading amount, turnover over, Amihud ratio
(i.e. price dispersion) and daily high-low price spread respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the bond-pair level in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1 if m = I and t− t∗ = k;
0 otherwise
(18)
Figure 7: Effects on deviations from LoP over time
Figure 7 plots the estimated δ coefficients and the 95 % confidence intervals, which
are adjusted for clustering at the pair level. Under the null hypothesis of no pre-treament
trends, we expect the δ coefficients for t < t∗ to be zero (where the treatment year is
t∗ = 2007). Inspection of Figure 7 shows that the δ coefficients in year 2005 and 2006
are close to zero. Although the 2006 coefficient is statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level, reassuringly its magnitude is much smaller than the effect we estimate
for the years following the introduction of bond lending. The introduction of bond lending
is estimated to cause a significant decrease in LOP deviations during the first three years
of the policy. Absolute yield spreads in the interbank market fall considerably in 2013
(relatively to their levels in the exchange market) and remain low during the following
years. The large estimated effect in 2013 is consistent with the fact that bond lending
transactions started experiencing a dramatic growth in that year driven by the increased
participation of large commercial banks (see Figure 1a and Figure 1b).
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6.2 Correlated Effects from the QFII Program
One potential concern with our approach is that the results may partially reflect the impacts
from other reforms of China’s bond markets. One of the most important policy changes
that have affected the treasury market in the past two decades is the Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investor (QFII) program. The QFII program has allowed selected global insti-
tutional investors to invest in China’s RMB denominated capital market, including China’s
treasury market. Arguably, the opening up and diversification of the investor base of
China’s treasury market can improve market efficiency. However, since the QFII program
was first launched in the exchange market in November 2002, prior to the introduction of
bond lending in the interbank market, the introduction of the QFII program cannot affect
our estimates.
In March 2013, the QFII program was extended to the interbank market. Since QFIIs
were already permitted to participate in the exchange market, this extension of the program
may bias our estimates by differentially affecting the two markets. While the bias may not
be large given the low participation rate of foreign investors in China’s RMB bond markets,
we control for this potential confounding factor by repeating our analysis on a restricted
subsample. We constrain the time horizon of our study up to February 2013, right before
QFII was launched in the interbank market. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 show that the
results from this restricted subsample are similar to our baseline results. The estimated
effect of bond lending on absolute yield spreads is a reduction of 82-87 basis points.
6.3 Correlated Effects from the Introduction of Treasury Futures
Another policy that may have affected China’s bond markets is the (re)introduction of
treasury futures in August 2013 (trading of treasury futures was suspended in 1995).
Investors can use treasury futures to hedge against interest rate risk. Moreover, to profit
from falling bond prices, investors can short the futures and close the position with a
counteracting long order. Thus, although shorting mechanisms were severely limited in
China’s bond markets before the introduction of bond lending, it may be argued that
shorting treasuries in the future market could have affected the spot market.
To disentangle possible spillovers from the treasury future market to the treasury spot
market, we again constrain the treatment period from 2007 up to August 2013, right before
the re-launch of treasury futures. Results from column (3) and (4) of Table 8 show that
our estimates from this subsample are similar to our baseline estimates. Bond lending is
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estimated to reduce absolute yield spreads by 82-87 basis points.18
Table 8: Subsample 2005 - 2013
Prior to QFII Prior to Treasury Futures
2005-Feb 2013 2005-Sep 2013
Absolute yield spread Yimt (1) (2) (3) (4)
fm 0.360** 0.319* 0.360** 0.319*
(0.150) (0.170) (0.150) (0.170)
Dmt -0.867*** -0.820*** -0.867*** -0.820***
(0.230) (0.242) (0.230) (0.242)
ttmit -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
gmt 0.180 0.185 0.180 0.185
(0.150) (0.153) (0.150) (0.153)
Observations 1,496 1,496 1,500 1,500
R-squared 0.511 0.555 0.511 0.555
Pair FE Y Y
Time-varying pair FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Notes: All columns are estimated with year fixed effect. Robust standard errors clustered at
the bond-pair level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
6.4 Bond Lending and Outright Repos
Our interpretation of the empirical findings relies on the assumption that the introduction
of bond lending enabled the short-selling of bonds. However, prior to the launch of bond
lending at the end of 2006, there was another mechanism that might have been used to
carry out short-selling transactions, namely outright repos. In a repurchase agreement
(repo), a cash borrower sells a fixed income security (e.g. a bond) to the cash lender and
buys it back at a later date. Under an outright repo transaction, the ownership of the
collateral is transferred to the cash lender for the length of the transaction (while this is
not the case with a pledged repo agreement). Thus, theoretically the cash lender could use
the collateral and engage in a short-sale. The outright repo mechanism was first introduced
18Since in 2013 there is only 1 matched bond pair with 4 contemporaneous trading days, results across
column (1)-(4) in Table 8 are quite similar.
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to China’s interbank bond market in May 2004, followed by the outright repo trading on
the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) for investors later in the same year.19
If bond lending and outright repos were perfect substitutes, then bond short-selling
should have been possible even before the introduction of bond lending. In this case, our
causal interpretation of the empirical findings would be less plausible. However, there are
several reasons why bond lending and outright repos are unlikely to be perfect substitutes.
First, while outright repos are designed as a mechanism for borrowing and lending cash,
security lending is a mechanism for security financing. For instance, Fan and Zhang (2007)
state that “the repo markets in China are mainly markets for participants to borrow or
lend money, rather than to borrow or lend securities” (page 940). Second, while during an
outright repo period bonds cannot be replaced nor cash settlement is allowed, in the bond
lending both parties can replace the pledged bonds or settle the deal in cash when it is due
upon mutual agreement (Artitle 7.7 and Article 7.8 of “Rules for Bond Transactions of
the National Inter-Bank Market” published by CFETS).20 Third, the bond lending period
ranges from minimum 1 day to the maximum 365 days, and mid-to-long term transactions
are often used in short-sales, while the tenor of repos is only up to a maximum of 91 days
(Article 6.3 and Article 7.2 of the above Rules). These facts suggest that bond lending
and outright repos are not perfect substitutes. Thus, it is likely the introduction of bond
lending in Chinese bond markets has enabled more bond shorting activity than previously
possible.
7 Conclusion
We examine the effect of the introduction of bond lending in China’s bond market on
yield spreads between similar bonds to understand the nature of deviations from the law
of one price (LOP). By comparing the dynamics of yield spreads for the same set of bonds
across China’s two co-existing bond markets, we rule out biases arising from changes in the
composition of our sample around the time of the policy change as well as market-specific
factors. We find that the introduction of bond lending has reduced LOP deviations, in
accordance with the limits-to-arbitrage view. This effect is stronger for pairs of bonds that
have a larger gap in their issuance dates. We document that a considerable number of
19In April 2004, the People’s Bank of China, China’s Ministry of Finance, and China Securities Regulatory




observations represent arbitrage opportunities in terms of profits net of bond lending fees.
We also show that the introduction of bond lending has led to a decline in gross arbitrage
profits, but did not result in asymmetric changes in liquidity between matched bonds,
contrary to the predictions of the asymmetric equilibria of Vayanos and Weill (2008)’s
model.
The finding that the introduction of bond lending in China’s markets has not led
to liquidity-based LOP deviations should not be interpreted as a refutation of Vayanos
and Weill (2008)’s model, since the model has multiple equilibria, including a symmetric
equilibrium where the LOP holds. Moreover, our evidence does not imply the predictions of
the asymmetric equilibrium will not be borne out in other settings. Indeed, such asymmetric
equilibrium qualitatively and quantitatively matches the empirical evidence about the on-
the-run premium in US treasury markets. However, our findings suggest more empirical
work is needed to establish settings in which different equilibria of Vayanos and Weill (2008)
are likely to arise.
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Additional Figures and Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics of treasury secondary market sample
Interbank market
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median
trading amount (million RMB) 2,828,347 24.71 292.82 0
coupon rate (%) 2,828,347 3.6 .86 3.55
coupon frequency 2,665,070 1.58 .49 2
maturity at issuance (year) 2,828,347 12.86 11.66 10
issuance year 2,828,347 2011.39 4.03 2013
issuance month 2,828,347 6.96 3.14 7
maturity year 2,828,347 2024.22 12.04 2021
maturity month 2,828,347 6.56 3.19 7
# of trading days for active bonds 83,592 754.61 462.31 700
Exchange market
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Median
trading amount (million RMB) 1,048,575 .73 20.12 0
coupon rate (%) 1,048,575 3.65 .56 3.57
coupon frequency 1,048,575 1.67 .47 2
maturity at issuance (year) 1,048,575 15.11 12.28 10
issuance year 1,048,575 2013.22 2.6 2014
issuance month 1,048,575 6.7 3.08 7
maturity year 1,048,575 2028.3 11.95 2023
maturity month 1,048,575 6.13 3.11 6
# of trading days for active bonds 28,914 2107.80 1641.53 1071
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the secondary market treasury transaction data. The
sample used for the table includes treasury trading during the sample period (excluding discounted bond
and subsequent offerings) prior to the matching pair analysis. The sample period for is January 1, 2000
to December 9, 2019.
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Table 2: Bond lending transaction: borrower and lender structure in 2019
Institution type # of institutions Bonds lent (RMB bn)
National commercial bank 5 1974
City commercial bank 21 915
Joint stock commercial bank 10 650




Institution type # of institutions Bonds borrowed (RMB bn)
Securities 34 1548
Joint stock commercial bank 11 834
Others 14 829
City commercial bank 20 485
Rural commercial bank 10 215
National commercial bank 2 85
Total 91 3995
Notes: Classification of transactions by institution type in each buy and sell directions are based
on top 100 tradings in the year of 2019 published by Chinabond, which covers more than 90%
of the total trading took place in 2019. “Others” include credit union, insurance companies,
money market fund, and wealth management products issued by banks and securities, and
foreign institutions.
Table 3: Bond lending transactions by bond types: December 2019
Bond type Trading amount Share # of Share Lending fee (%)
(billion RMB) transaction weighted avg
L001 30 5% 192 9% 0.6150
L007 93 16% 768 37% 0.8845
L014 75 13% 428 21% 0.7362
L021 131 22% 164 8% 0.4489
L1M 149 25% 227 11% 0.4927
L2M 34 6% 100 5% 0.5658
L3M 12 2% 42 2% 0.5430
L4M 12 2% 45 2% 0.5224
L6M 40 7% 56 3% 0.4967
L9M 2 0% 5 0% 0.5150
L1Y 5 1% 23 1% 0.6154
Total 584 2050 0.5903
Source: Bond lending monthly bulletin, December 2019, China Foreign Exchange Trade System
36
Table 4: Matched pairs trading distribution: same trading day vs trading window
Day match Window match
# of trades # of pairs # of Obs # of pairs
Interbank market 1036 24 1184 37
Exchange market 1213 9 357 8
Total 2249 33 1541 45
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Treasury trading amount in two markets
Notes: This figure plots the total annual trading amount of treasury in the interbank and exchange from
2005 to 2019.
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Figure 2: Yields to maturity
Notes: Figure 2 shows boxplots of yield to maturity for matched bonds in the exchange and interbank
market. Each boxplot plots value from the top to bottom the corresponding value of upper adjacent value,
75th percentile, median, 25th percentile and lower adjacent value. Note the upper adjacent value is the
highest value not greater than 75th percentile + 3/2 (75th percentile - 25th percentile) and the lower
adjacent value is the lowest value not less than 25th percentile - 3/2 ((75th percentile - 25th percentile).
Outside values of the upper or lower adjacent value are not plotted.
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